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Deprivations of Liberty:  
The Impact of the Charter on 
Substantive Criminal Law 
Alan Young 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Government of Canada’s gift for the 30th anniversary of the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 has been the 2012 enactment of 
the omnibus bill known as the Safe Streets and Communities Act.2 This 
piece of legislation has been the culmination of five years of net-
widening initiatives to increase sentence severity and to proscribe new 
forms of criminal conduct. One might have expected that net-widening 
of social control through criminal sanctions would have diminished and 
not expanded in the Charter era, considering that rights-bearing constitu-
tions are predicated on the values of classical liberalism. In this vision of 
political life, the state’s role is largely to provide for order and security 
by establishing the conditions to allow individuals to freely choose and 
pursue the type of life they believe to be valuable and worthwhile 
without compelling them to follow a particular conception of the good 
life. The anomalous emergence of net-widening legislative initiatives in a 
political regime of constitutional constraints raises the often-debated 
question of whether there are constitutional limits to the growth of 
substantive criminal law and, specifically, whether the right to liberty 
enshrined in section 7 of the Charter can exert a countervailing force on a 
political agenda premised upon increased criminalization as a response to 
perceived social problems. 
As we celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Charter, it is interesting 
and sobering to note that the World Justice Project’s 2011 report, The 
Rule of Law Index, ranks Canada relatively low in terms of the protection 
                                                                                                             
 Associate Professor and Director of the Innocence Project at Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 S.C. 2012, c. 1. 
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of “fundamental rights” in comparison to other Western liberal democra-
cies (Canada ranks ninth out of 12 countries).3 The World Justice Project 
takes the position that compliance with the dictates of the rule of law 
extend beyond the need for laws which are general, clear and accessible, 
as it recognizes that the “rule of law must be more than merely a system 
of rules — that indeed, a system of positive law that fails to respect core 
human rights guaranteed and established under international law is at 
best ‘rule by law’, and does not deserve to be called a rule of law 
system”.4 It is said that there are two versions of the rule of law, a thick 
version and a thin version. A “thick” conception of the rule of law 
demands that, in addition to meeting formal requirements, the law must 
reflect substantive requirements (i.e., respect for dignity and equality and 
the strengthening of fundamental freedoms), whereas a “thin” conception 
places no substantive restrictions on law but does require that legal rules 
contain minimum standards relating to clarity, accessibility and consis-
tency.5 Although the Supreme Court of Canada has clearly held that the 
rule of law is a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the 
Charter,6 the Court has also limited the scope of the principle and 
suggested that “it is difficult to conceive of how the rule of law could be 
used as a basis for invalidating legislation ... based on its content. That is 
because none of the principles that the rule of law embraces speak 
directly to the terms of legislation”.7 
The Supreme Court of Canada may be correct in suggesting that the 
rule of law principle does not place specific substantive constraints on 
the content of criminal law, but the Court has failed to recognize how the 
principle does serve to facilitate the protection of “fundamental rights” as 
suggested by the World Justice Project. The rule of law and liberty are 
intertwined. One need go no further than A.C. Dicey’s first of three 
definitions of the rule of law: “no man is punishable or can be lawfully 
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law 
established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the 
                                                                                                             
3 Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero & Alejandro Ponce, The World Justice Project 
Rule of Law Index 2011 (Washington, DC: The World Justice Project, 2011), at 21-24, 51. 
4 Id., at 11. 
5 Mark Carter, “The Rule of Law, Legal Rights in the Charter, and the Supreme Court’s 
New Positivism” (2008) 33 Queen’s L.J. 459. 
6 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 
1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”]; R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical 
Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at para. 28 (S.C.C.). 
7 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 
473, at para. 59 (S.C.C.). 
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land”.8 In this sense, the rule of law serves to limit arbitrary power by 
ensuring that state-citizen relationships are governed by predictable rules 
of general application, but it goes one step further in terms of having a 
role to play in protecting liberty. 
In serving to curb arbitrary power, Dicey’s simple pronouncement 
establishes two constraints on the exercise of political power. One could 
engage in an endless philosophical debate on the meaning and scope of 
liberty in the futile effort to construct an “all-purpose, top-down, totaliz-
ing theory of liberty”,9 but it is easier, and more practical, to define 
liberty in terms of Dicey’s first definition of the rule of law. First, liberty 
cannot be overridden unless the state explicitly creates a prohibitory 
sanction for the exercise of liberty. Liberty thrives where law does not 
extend. In other words, a “totalizing” theory of liberty is not needed as 
liberty becomes simply defined as any action not prohibited by law. 
However, this simple constraint on political power cannot adequately 
protect liberty in the face of a zealous crusader acting in the guise of a 
lawmaker. Omnibus legislation prescribing countless restrictions on 
liberty would not violate this notion of the rule of law, and liberty will be 
precariously protected if one does not recognize that the rule of law’s 
opposition to arbitrary rule entails another constraint beyond the formal 
need to enact law in order to override liberty. 
Accordingly, the rule of law imposes a second constraint on the exer-
cise of arbitrary political power — the state should be able to provide a 
reasoned justification if its authority to enact law is called into question. 
Presumably, state action should be considered arbitrary if the state cannot 
provide a reasoned justification for the action being undertaken. One 
might disagree with the reasoning and the justification advanced by the 
state, but this would not relegate the action to the realm of the arbitrary. 
In commenting on the evolution of the concept of due process in the 
Anglo-American tradition, it has been noted that “the due process of law 
guarantee is an effort — one with deep roots in the history of western 
civilization — to reduce the power of the state to a comprehensible, 
rational and principled order, and to ensure that citizens are not deprived 
of life, liberty, or property except for good reason”.10 Good reasons, 
properly defined, can pre-empt any claim of arbitrariness. 
                                                                                                             
8 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1886), at 174. 
9 McDonald v. Chicago (City), 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3100 (2010) [hereinafter “McDonald”]. 
10 Timothy Sandefur, “In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of a Lawful 
Rule” (2011) 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 284, at 285 (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Sandefur”]. 
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There may be differences in various jurisdictions with respect to the 
specific rights enumerated in their constitutions, but several commenta-
tors have noted that a common feature of constitutional adjudication 
around the world is the application of some form of proportionality test 
in assessing the validity of state action.11 At the heart of any proportion-
ality test is the idea that the state should be in a position to justify its 
decision to override rights, and this justification will primarily involve 
showing that it is pursuing valid objectives that “sound in the constitu-
tional register”.12 As Professor Greene has noted: 
Proportionality analysis is interesting not because it contemplates 
balancing in the strict sense, which I presume to be a feature of all the 
world’s constitutional courts, but because it does so only after requiring 
the government to justify its actions by reference to a limited set of 
objectives and procedural options. These distinctive features aim for 
rule of law in the strictest sense — that is, the sense in which we mean 
to reduce the discretion of the entire government, and not just of 
judges.13 
Canada may rank low in the Rule of Law Index, and in its protection 
of fundamental rights, but it is not clear if this low ranking is being 
assessed solely on the basis of the actions (or inaction) of government, or 
whether this assessment includes the response of courts to state action. 
Regardless, the inadequate protection of rights cannot be placed solely 
on the shoulders of government in a constitutional regime, as “most 
powerful supreme and constitutional courts in the world today under-
stand their central mission to be the robust protection of fundamental 
rights”.14 On the surface, it appears that Canadian courts, and constitu-
tional courts around the world, also understand that the rule of law 
prohibition on arbitrary power “means that legislatures are granted a 
limited power to override constitutional rights, which is validly exercised 
when the relevant burden of justification is satisfied”.15 
In this brief paper, I will address two related questions with respect 
to the contribution that section 7 of the Charter has made in advancing 
                                                                                                             
11 Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two decades of Proportionality 
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501. 
12 Jamal Greene, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards” (2011) 99 Geo. L.J. 1288, at 
1293. 
13 Id. 
14 Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, “All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review 
and the Problem of Balancing” (2011) 60 Emory L.J. 797, at 870. 
15 Stephen Gardbaum, “The Myth and Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism” 
(2008) 107 Mich. L. Rev. 391, at 430. 
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the pursuit of liberty. The first question is whether the “right to liberty” 
in section 7 protects “fundamental personal choices” by effectively 
creating a private sphere of conduct and choice free from routine 
criminalization. In other words, does section 7 facilitate “self-
sovereignty”16 by ensuring that fundamental personal decisions will not 
be the subject matter of criminal sanction unless the government has 
compelling reasons to invade this sphere of self-sovereignty? Assuming 
that a fundamental personal decision can be overridden by a compelling 
state objective raises a second question: what constitutes a valid and 
legitimate state objective that sounds in the constitutional register? In 
other words, in the context of criminal law, what state objectives can 
provide a sufficient justification to warrant the imposition of the punitive 
sanction? 
Professor Hamish Stewart concludes that “even though relatively few 
statutes have been invalidated on section 7 grounds, the generous 
interpretation of section 7 in the Motor Vehicle Reference has had a 
beneficial effect on Canadian legal culture”.17 I would agree that the 
rhetoric employed by Canadian courts in fundamental justice cases does 
warmly embrace the notion of fundamental rights free from unjustified 
state interference, and in that sense, there has been a “beneficial effect on 
Canadian legal culture”. However, the assessment of the strength and 
value of fundamental justice review by the Canadian judiciary is less 
impressive when one looks specifically at the question of whether the 
courts have employed a coherent and consistent approach to the question 
of when the state may have compelling reasons to override a fundamen-
tal personal decision. 
II. THE PROMISE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
The concept of substantive due process means different things to dif-
ferent people, but at its essence it is a form of judicial review which 
engages an assessment of the merits or value of public policy choices 
as reflected in legislative enactments. The concept was developed by the 
United States Supreme Court over the latter half of the 20th century, and 
it has many detractors in the United States who condemn the doctrine as 
a “contradiction in terms”, an “oxymoron”, a “momentous sham”, a 
                                                                                                             
16 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, at 724 (1997) [hereinafter “Glucksberg”]. 
17 Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 311. 
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“made-up, atextual invention” and the “most unconstitutional branch of 
constitutional law”.18 The detractors believe that the concept of due 
process only extends to review of state action for compliance with norms 
of procedural fairness. 
In previous papers, I have provided various justifications for engag-
ing in vigorous substantive review in Canada,19 and it is not my intention 
to revisit this ongoing debate. Suffice it to say, regardless of whether one 
supports judicial activism or judicial deference, there is no question that 
substantive review of some form has been accepted and adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. In 1985, in the seminal Motor Vehicle 
Reference, Lamer J. noted that fundamental justice was not restricted to 
procedural concerns and natural justice, and that “[t]he task of the Court 
is not to choose between substantive or procedural content per se but to 
secure for persons ‘the full benefit of the Charter’s protection’ ... while 
avoiding adjudication of the merits of public policy”.20 A few years later, 
Lamer J. dropped the admonishment of avoiding review of merits and 
simply stated that “while Parliament retains the power to define the 
elements of a crime, the courts now have the jurisdiction and, more 
important, the duty, when called upon to do so, to review that definition 
to ensure that it is in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice”.21 
In 2006, a badly divided Supreme Court assessed and reviewed the 
merits of public health care and concluded that serious deficiencies in the 
public system required the constitutional invalidation of a prohibition on 
obtaining insurance for private health care.22 The Court recognized that 
its review was an intrusion into a purely political consideration, i.e., the 
merits of an exclusive and universal health care system and the efficient 
allocation of resources to administer this system, but this did not stop the 
Court. Chief Justice McLachlin noted that “it is the high duty of this 
Court to insure that the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their 
                                                                                                             
18 Ryan C. Williams, “The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause” (2010) 120 Yale 
L.J. 408, at 411; Sandefur, supra, note 10, at 284. 
19 Alan N. Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum Content 
of Criminal Law” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 441 [hereinafter “Young, ‘Done Nothing Wrong’”]; Alan 
N. Young, “Fundamental Justice and Political Power: A Personal Reflection on Twenty Years in the 
Trenches” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 121. 
20 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”]. 
21 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 118, at para. 26 (S.C.C.). 
22 Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. 
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constitutional mandate”23 and “[t]he fact that the matter is complex, 
contentious or laden with social values does not mean that the courts can 
abdicate the responsibility”24 of review. Substantive review is not beyond 
the authority of the Court, and “[t]he mere fact that this question may 
have policy ramifications does not permit us to avoid answering it.”25 
The real controversy in the United States surrounding substantive 
due process review is not simply the idea of a court reviewing the merits 
of public policy — this will be unavoidable with respect to some types of 
constitutional claims. Rather, the controversy involves a fear that the 
doctrine will allow a court to expand the protection of the Constitution 
beyond specific rights enumerated in the document. In fact, this is 
precisely what occurred in the zenith of American substantive review as 
the Supreme Court created a constitutionally protected zone of privacy 
despite the fact that privacy is not an enumerated right. The Court 
extended the concept of substantive due process to include protection for 
fundamental, but non-enumerated, rights on the theory that the rights 
enumerated “in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”.26 
In 1997 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether a right to assisted suicide can be considered a fundamen-
tal, non-enumerated right. In rejecting assisted suicide as a fundamental 
right the Court provided this summary of its achievements under the 
rubric of substantive due process: 
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 
‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint. 
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068-
1069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (Due Process Clause “protects 
individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them’”) (quoting Daniels 
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 
(1986)). The Clause also provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1446-
1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Casey, 505 U.S., at 851, 112 S.Ct., at 
2806-2807. In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the 
specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the “liberty” specially 
                                                                                                             
23 Id., at para. 107. 
24 Id. 
25 Id., at para. 108. 
26 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 484 (1965). 
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protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); 
to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 
535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); to direct the education and 
upbringing of one’s children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 
S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); to 
use contraception, ibid.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 
1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), and to abortion, 
Casey, supra. We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the 
Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted 
lifesaving medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S., at 278-279, 110 S.Ct., 
at 2851-2852.27 
In 2010 Stevens J. of the United States Supreme Court noted that the 
“conceptual core” of the Due Process Clause “safeguards, most basically, 
‘the ability to define one’s identity’, ‘the individual’s right to make 
certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his 
family’s, destiny’”.28 This list of American substantive due process 
achievements in protecting autonomous decision-making on fundamental 
personal matters was cited by Wilson J. in her concurring judgment in 
the Morgentaler case.29 Although Morgentaler, and the constitutional 
validity of a prohibition on abortion, was decided upon the basis of 
procedural unfairness in accessing this medical service, Wilson J. was the 
first Canadian judge to adopt the American due process concept that 
equates the right to liberty with the right to make fundamental personal 
decisions. She concluded that: 
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter 
is founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without 
interference from the state. This right is a critical component of the 
right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a 
broad range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed, 
grants the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of 
fundamental personal importance.30 
                                                                                                             
27 Glucksberg, supra, note 16, at 719. 
28 McDonald, supra, note 9, at 3101. 
29 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mor-
gentaler”]. 
30 Id., at para. 228. 
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After Morgentaler, the idea that the right to liberty extended to 
fundamental personal decisions was cited with approval in numerous 
decisions.31 In addition, the protection of fundamental personal decisions 
finds further indirect support in cases dealing with the right to security. 
There exists a significant overlap between the right to liberty and the 
right to security when liberty is extended to fundamental personal 
decisions. The right to security includes the right to protect one’s 
physical and psychological integrity,32 and there is a greater likelihood of 
psychological harm when state action interferes with decisions that are 
integral to one’s personhood and identity. The Morgentaler invalidation 
of the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code33 was predicated on the 
fact that the procedural obstacles and delays found within the legislative 
regime impaired a woman’s right to security by triggering an increased 
risk of both physical and psychological harm. However, the increased 
risk of psychological harm was directly related to the fact that the 
legislation interfered with autonomous decision-making of a very 
personal nature. Therefore, the right of security may not encompass a 
right to autonomous decision-making, but in cases in which a court finds 
that the security interest has been impaired because state action has 
negatively affected one’s psychological well-being, this indirectly will 
provide some protection for self-sovereignty and the right to make 
fundamental personal decisions.34 
In adopting the conceptual core of American due process by extend-
ing Charter protection to fundamental personal decisions, the Canadian 
courts may not have fully realized that there has been a constitutional 
price to be paid in American constitutional law when an individual’s 
choice has been judicially characterized as being fundamental and 
personal. When a right is characterized as fundamental the American 
                                                                                                             
31 For example, Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, 
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of 
Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B. (R.)”]; 
Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1977] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Godbout”]; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “G. (J.)”]; Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human 
Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.); R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. 
No. 2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Parker”]; Hitzig v. Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 
3873, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 104 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hitzig”]. 
32 Morgentaler, supra, note 29; B. (R.), id. 
33 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
34 Chaoulli, supra, note 22; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Socie-
ty, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”]; Victoria (City) v. 
Adams, [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Adams”]. 
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courts are required to apply heightened or strict scrutiny upon judicial 
review: the prohibition “may be justified by a compelling state interest 
and must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests 
at stake”.35 However, if a fundamental right is not at issue, the courts 
apply a more deferential standard known as “rational basis review” — 
this lower standard of scrutiny only requires that the impugned legisla-
tion be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest”.36 The 
constitutional cost of designating a right as fundamental is that it attracts 
a form of strict judicial scrutiny which readily leads to invalidation, 
whereas when legislation impairs a non-fundamental right, the lowered 
standard of scrutiny rarely leads to invalidation.37 
It did appear that the Supreme Court of Canada finally came to adopt 
the American substantive due process concept that interference with 
fundamental rights attracts strict scrutiny upon constitutional review. The 
primacy of fundamental personal decisions crystallized in the overlooked 
decision of the Court in Godbout in 1997.38 The Court confronted a 
fundamental justice claim in a non-criminal context. As a condition of 
employment for a municipality, the employee was required to reside 
within its boundaries. The Court invalidated the regulation on the basis 
that it unjustifiably interfered with the “irreducible sphere of personal 
autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free 
from state interference”.39 The Court noted that it had already identified 
that “liberty” under section 7 extends beyond physical restrictions on 
freedom to encompass matters which are “inherently personal such that, 
by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core of 
what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence”.40 The 
Court concluded that “if deprivations of the rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person are to survive Charter scrutiny, they must be 
‘fundamentally just’ not only in terms of the process by which they are 
carried out but also in terms of the ends they seek to achieve, as mea-
sured against basic tenets of both our judicial system and our legal 
system more generally”.41 Freedom to choose one’s place of residence 
                                                                                                             
35 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, at 688 (1977). 
36 Cook v. Gates, 528 F. 3d 42, at 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2008). 
37 Julie McKenna, “Stay Calm, Don’t Get Hysterical: A User’s Guide to Arguing the Un-
constitutionality of Anti-Vibrator Statutes” (2011) 33 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 211, at 242 [hereinafter 
“McKenna”]. 
38 Godbout, supra, note 31. 
39 Id., at para. 66. 
40 Id. 
41 Id., at para. 74. 
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could be “subordinated to substantial and compelling collective interests” 
but, in this case, the Court rejected a number of different state-sponsored 
justifications for the residency restriction. Godbout laid the foundation of 
exacting constitutional scrutiny when the law interferes with the right to 
decisions of “fundamental personal importance”. 
Strict scrutiny of fundamental rights’ violations is nothing more than 
a rigorous balancing test with the scales tipped heavily in favour of the 
rights-holder, whereas rational basis review for non-fundamental rights is 
a balancing test with the scales tilted in favour of the state. This two-
tiered structure of judicial review has been implicitly incorporated into 
fundamental justice review in Canada because the Supreme Court of 
Canada has often undertaken fundamental justice review on the basis of 
balancing state versus individual interests without the need for identify-
ing a specific principle of fundamental justice. In most cases where a 
balancing exercise is undertaken it would be reasonable to assume that as 
the significance and importance of the right increases it will be incum-
bent on the state to provide a more significant and compelling reason for 
violating the right. Strict scrutiny in cases of fundamental rights’ viola-
tion is a matter of common sense. 
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced a balancing ap-
proach to section 7,42 and within two years the Court held that 
“[f]undamental justice in our Canadian legal tradition ... is primarily 
designed to ensure that a fair balance be struck between the interests of 
society and those of its citizens”.43 A decade later, the Court held that 
the relevant principles of fundamental justice are determined by a 
contextual approach that “takes into account the nature of the decision 
to be made”. ... The approach is essentially one of balancing. As we 
said in Burns, “[i]t is inherent in the ... balancing process that the 
outcome may well vary from case to case depending on the mix of 
contextual factors put into the balance”.44 
As will be discussed, the Supreme Court of Canada has retreated 
from the practice of balancing interests under section 7, but as the 
Charter was evolving, the Court developed all the conceptual tools to 
allow for vigorous judicial review to protect fundamental non-
enumerated rights. Of course, the actual ability to achieve strict scrutiny 
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of state objectives to override an interference with a fundamental 
personal decision would be limited by two practical obstacles: a litigant’s 
ability to compile the requisite legislative fact evidence, and the related 
problem that the burden of proof lies with the litigant to demonstrate the 
absence of a compelling state interest. Putting aside the notion that the 
rule of law would be better served if the state bore the burden of provid-
ing a reasoned justification for any restriction on liberty, even with the 
logistical obstacles, the courts have provided adequate doctrinal tools in 
its interpretation of the Charter to allow this branch of government to 
establish a zone of self-sovereignty free from criminal prohibition in the 
absence of a compelling and narrowly-tailored state objective. This did 
not actually happen. 
III. THE REALITY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that the substantive merits of 
legislation can be reviewed in the course of constitutional adjudication, 
the courts do not readily embrace the concept that there is a sphere of 
personal decision-making that is beyond the authority of the legislature 
to control, save and except when there is a compelling state interest to 
override self-sovereignty. The courts pay lip service to the concept, but 
they rarely designate a person’s choice as being fundamental and 
personal, and they rarely question whether the legislature has an interest 
that rises to the level of a compelling state objective. 
The Supreme Court has employed the rhetoric of liberty as a funda-
mental personal decision in a number of cases both before and after the 
Godbout ruling. The discourse on fundamental personal decision has 
arisen in the context of choice of residence,45 choice of shelter,46 choice 
of medical treatment,47 choices relating to the care and upbringing of 
one’s children,48 and choices relating to the terminal stages of one’s 
life.49 However, the characterization of a decision as fundamental has 
only led to the Court granting a remedy in three contexts: choice of 
medical treatment; choice of residence; and choice of shelter. Godbout 
was the frontrunner, and it did result in the invalidation of municipal 
restriction on choice of residence because the restriction on the funda-
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mental decision of where to reside was not overridden by a compelling 
state interest. However, even this designation of choice of residence as a 
fundamental, personal decision has proved controversial as, in 2011, the 
Supreme Court of Canada called into question this designation as not 
representing the views of the majority of the Court.50 
With the designation of choice of personal residence as a fundamen-
tal decision being called into question, the only incontrovertible example 
of a liberty interest being designated as fundamental, and leading to far-
reaching remedies, involves the decision-making with respect to the 
choice of medical treatment. The choice of medical treatment being 
designated as a fundamental personal decision has led to a suspended 
invalidation of laws relating to use of marijuana until the Parliament 
of Canada created a meaningful exemption program to allow medical 
patients to legally access and use marijuana as medicine.51 It has also led 
to the lifting of the prohibition on privately insured medical treatment. 
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the choice of 
medical treatment should be treated as a fundamental right to autono-
mous decision-making.52 As mentioned earlier, the elevation of medical 
decision-making to the level of a fundamental right is further strength-
ened by the fact that the courts have found in some cases that interfer-
ence with this right constitutes a violation of one’s right to security under 
section 7 without needing to rely upon the concept of liberty as encom-
passing fundamental, personal decisions.53 
Outside of the context of medical care, the concept of fundamental, 
personal decision-making has had little or no practical impact. For 
example, in Rodriguez,54 the Supreme Court had little difficulty in 
characterizing the choice of when to terminate one’s life as a fundamen-
tal, personal decision, but this characterization did not lead the Court to 
assess whether Parliament had a compelling interest in prohibiting 
assisted suicide. Instead of assessing whether a compelling interest can 
serve to override the fundamental right, the Court simply concluded that 
Canada and other jurisdictions have historically limited the right to 
terminate one’s life, and this historical practice seemed to serve as a 
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proxy for Parliament having a compelling interest in the modern era. 
Similarly, In B. (R.),55 the Court was faced with the right of parents to 
choose a medical intervention for their child which was consistent with 
their religious beliefs, but it ultimately held that the state had legitimate 
interests in overriding the fundamental, personal decision without an 
exacting assessment of whether these interests were compelling and 
narrowly tailored. 
One can see how the designation as fundamental becomes mere rhe-
torical device by looking at how lower courts have recently applied the 
concept.56 In 2011, a challenge was brought to provincial law which 
prevented the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk. In an era of 
mass production of food, with the recurring problem of food recalls due 
to contamination, one can easily see how the choice of what foods one 
consumes might be characterized as a fundamental, personal decision. 
The Court acknowledges that this is an appropriate characterization, but 
the characterization does not lead to a form of strict scrutiny in search of 
a narrowly tailored state objective. The Court simply applies a deferential 
standard akin to the rational basis review employed by American courts. 
The Court stated: 
It is acknowledged that in general terms an individual has the right to 
make decisions regarding their own bodily integrity and personal 
health, as recognized by La Forest J. in Rodriguez v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 at paragraph 36. However, it 
does not logically follow that the right to security of the person of raw 
milk consumers will necessarily be infringed if the Respondent’s cow-
share arrangement is found to be illegal. The preponderance of 
scientific evidence cited offers factual support for the assertion that 
human consumption of raw milk may be hazardous to one’s health or at 
least more hazardous than the health risk presented by the consumption 
of pasteurized milk. The wide interest in this litigation serves to 
confirm this assessment is not universally held and there are many 
residents of Ontario who have consumed a life-times worth of raw milk 
and raw milk products without any ill effects. On the basis of the expert 
evidence provided at trial it cannot however be concluded, in my view, 
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that the resultant legislative restriction on the sale and distribution of 
raw milk is either arbitrary or overly broad.57 
Perhaps the application of a rational basis test to a fundamental, per-
sonal decision can be justified on the basis that the prohibition on the 
sale of unpasteurized milk was not a criminal sanction but a mere 
regulatory offence. However, it would be difficult to justify resorting to 
the low, deferential standard when the state interferes with the fundamen-
tal, personal decision by resorting to the moral condemnation of the 
criminal sanction. Yet, in the recent challenge to the prohibition on 
polygamous relationships,58 the Court had no difficulty concluding that 
one’s choice of life partner(s) is a fundamental personal decision (as was 
decided by American courts over 40 years ago), but this characterization 
did not appear to have a practical impact on the constitutional analysis. 
The Court did go to great lengths to identify the various state objectives 
underlying the prohibition, but strict scrutiny for a narrowly tailored 
interest was not undertaken. There is little doubt that the state has an 
interest in protecting individuals from abusive relationships, but if the 
concept of a fundamental right has any practical meaning, it is not 
sufficient to simply identify that Parliament has a rational basis for 
enacting the prohibition. The real question should have been whether 
Parliament’s interest is so compelling that it is constitutionally authorized 
to enact a blanket prohibition which prevents those who are not in 
abusive polygamous relationships from exercising their fundamental 
right to choose their life partners. 
Due to the fact that it would be difficult for a court to justify the use 
of a low, deferential standard of review when Parliament has interfered 
with fundamental choices by way of criminal sanction, it is easier for a 
court to recast a person’s choices as trivial as opposed to fundamental. In 
the challenges to the prohibition on the use and possession of marijuana, 
the Supreme Court did not feel the need to employ an exacting, strict 
scrutiny review because it characterized the choice to use marijuana as a 
trivial lifestyle choice. The Court stated: 
While we accept Malmo-Levine’s statement that smoking marihuana is 
central to his lifestyle, the Constitution cannot be stretched to afford 
protection to whatever activity an individual chooses to define as 
central to his or her lifestyle. One individual chooses to smoke 
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marihuana; another has an obsessive interest in golf; a third is addicted 
to gambling. The appellant Caine invokes a taste for fatty foods. A 
society that extended constitutional protection to any and all such 
lifestyles would be ungovernable. Lifestyle choices of this order are 
not, we think, ‘basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy 
individual dignity and independence’ (Godbout, supra, at para. 66). 
In our view, with respect, Malmo-Levine’s desire to build a lifestyle 
around the recreational use of marihuana does not attract Charter 
protection. There is no free-standing constitutional right to smoke ‘pot’ 
for recreational purposes.59 
It is obvious that the Charter will be trivialized if strict scrutiny is 
applied to personal decisions which are picayune and petty, but one has 
to question whether a choice of lifestyle should be so quickly relegated to 
the category of the trivial. It is not helpful to marginalize the claim as 
being the assertion of a “free-standing constitutional right to smoke ‘pot’ 
for recreational purposes”. Narrowing the characterization of the claim 
renders it absurd. There is an abundance of sociological and anthropo-
logical evidence which demonstrates that the alteration of consciousness 
through plant intoxicants is an integral and fundamental aspect of 
personhood. Further, in the tradition of classical liberalism, the state 
should not be dictating lifestyle preferences, as the personal quest for 
self-fulfilment will take the individual down many different paths. It 
would be easy to characterize sporting activities as a mere lifestyle 
choice, but one has to wonder whether the Court would apply the same 
low, deferential standard of review should Parliament decide in its 
wisdom to ban sporting activities upon pain of criminal sanction. 
Despite its analytical potential and promise, it appears that creating 
the category of “fundamental personal decision” has not really helped in 
the analysis of section 7 liberty claims. First, dividing personal decisions 
into fundamental and non-fundamental is a value-laden exercise, and 
without the development of some criteria for determining when a 
decision goes to the core of personhood, the section 7 analysis will be 
unpredictable and confused. Perhaps there is a zone of self-sovereignty 
that demands strict scrutiny upon judicial review, but it is not readily 
ascertainable within the current doctrinal approach. Second, when the 
Court can easily designate a decision as fundamental, this ultimately 
does not assist the analysis because the Court does not provide any 
                                                                                                             
59 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at paras. 
86-87 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]. 
(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY 89 
specific or unique methodology for analyzing the constitutionality of 
state interference with this type of fundamental decision. 
Not only is the fundamental rights doctrine unpredictable and under-
developed, there is also reason to conclude that the Court is basically 
unwilling to apply strict scrutiny, in its most rigorous form, to any 
parliamentary decision to criminalize conduct. The marijuana challenge 
has limited a court’s ability to impose strict scrutiny in reviewing the 
validity of criminal legislation in two significant ways. First, the Court 
would not employ a balancing test of proportionality to determine 
whether the state objective could override the liberty interest of the 
accused. The Court employed the “basic tenets” approach to address a 
more specific question of whether there exists a principle of fundamental 
justice that dictates that Parliament can only criminalize conduct upon 
proof of significant harm to others or society at large. Under the basic 
tenets approach, a principle becomes elevated into a constitutional 
principle of fundamental justice, if three criteria can be met: (1) “[i]t 
must be a legal principle”; (2) there must be a “consensus that the harm 
principle is vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice”; and (3) 
it must be “capable of being identified with some precision”.60 There is 
no question that these criteria provide a more transparent framework of 
analysis than does the proportionality analysis of state/citizen balanc-
ing,61 but this basic tenets approach is self-limiting because so few 
substantive principles can or will be elevated to this status.62 In addition, 
a basic tenet will prove resistant to growth and expansion because the 
requirement of “some degree of precision” will preclude principles of 
high generality from being adopted. Principles stated at a high level of 
generality have the potential for growth as the principle becomes 
instantiated in concrete cases. 
In the marijuana cases, the Court concluded that the “harm principle” 
was not a principle of fundamental justice because it was not a legal 
principle and it could not be defined with precision.63 As a result, 
Parliament is not constitutionally required to ensure that all criminal 
offences being enacted are based upon conduct harmful to others or to 
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society at large. At its highest, the Court may require that Parliament 
have a reasoned apprehension of a non-trivial harm, but in rejecting the 
harm principle as a limiting principle, the Court also gave the stamp of 
approval to criminalization in pursuit of paternalistic objectives. In 
addition, the Court found that the state objectives of protecting the 
vulnerable and the protection of core, societal values were objectives 
which sound in the constitutional register. The only state objective which 
the Court rejected as valid or legitimate for the purposes of criminal law 
is the imposition of a “certain standard of public and sexual morality”64 
or to “maintain conventional standards of propriety” which do not 
involve “some fundamental conception of morality”.65 Whether inten-
tionally or inadvertently, the basic tenets approach adopted by the Court 
authorizes Parliament to override liberty by criminal sanction whenever 
it has some rational basis for concluding a perceived social problem 
needs to be addressed by invocation of the criminal law. The bottom line 
is that there are no effective constitutional limits on the choice to 
criminalize conduct, and there is currently no zone of self-sovereignty 
which is presumptively beyond the reach of the criminal law unless the 
state can present compelling and narrowly tailored objectives to justify 
the intrusion in liberty. 
Even though balancing has problems of indeterminacy and subjectiv-
ity that do not plague the basic tenets approach, balancing is the type of 
proportionality analysis which is needed to establish effective substantive 
review. It is this type of analysis which can give practical effect to the 
concept that restrictions on fundamental rights need to be subject to 
exacting constitutional scrutiny. However, it appears that, in 2004, the 
Supreme Court finally laid to rest the overt public policy balancing 
which had been employed in earlier Charter cases. In the Demers case,66 
the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated provisions which effectively 
prevented an accused who is permanently unfit to stand trial, from ever 
being absolutely discharged. The Court concluded that the provisions 
suffered from constitutional overbreadth, but it was also argued that, on 
balance, the individual’s liberty and security interest outweighed Parlia-
ment’s goal on public protection. This balancing act was rejected by the 
Court: 
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In making this argument, the respondent misconceives the role played 
by ... “balancing” in the structure of s. 7 of the Charter. It effectively 
argues that it is a principle of fundamental justice that the correct 
balance be struck between individual and societal interests. However, 
as a majority of this Court made clear in the case of Malmo-Levine ... 
the “balancing of interests” referred to by McLachlin J. in Cunningham 
is to be taken into consideration by courts only when they are deriving 
or construing the content and scope of the principles of fundamental 
justice themselves. It is not in and of itself a freestanding principle of 
fundamental justice which must be respected if a deprivation of life, 
liberty and security of the person is to be upheld.67 
It is not at all clear what type of balancing would be undertaken in 
“deriving or construing the content and scope of the principles of 
fundamental justice themselves”, nor is it clear if this decision has 
definitively eliminated proportionality and balancing from the fundamen-
tal justice equation. Since Demers, the Supreme Court of Canada has on 
two occasions employed a “striking the right balance” approach to the 
adjudication of a fundamental justice claim,68 so it appears that the allure 
of balancing proves to be irresistible. Even though balancing will be a 
more effective technique to develop the zone of self-sovereignty, this 
assertion is predicated on the assumption that the courts would then 
naturally employ a form of strict scrutiny when confronted with a 
fundamental rights claim under section 7. This is not a safe assumption 
because it is not patently obvious that the Court has employed strict 
scrutiny when confronted with a fundamental rights claim under section 
2(b) of the Charter. Unlike the right to liberty, freedom of expression 
comes with a built-in designation of being fundamental, and, even 
though the rhetoric of the Court tracks the strict scrutiny approach, the 
practical application of this approach falls short in terms of rigorous 
strict scrutiny. 
The doctrinal structure of section 2(b) challenges requires the court 
to immediately apply a balancing or proportionality test because all 
forms of expression are covered by section 2(b), and the ultimate 
determination of the validity of the restriction turns on the application of 
the section 1 reasonable limits test. Upon a review of 31 constitutional 
challenges launched under section 2(b) of the Charter, we find 19 cases 
in which the restriction on expression was upheld under section 1, and 13 
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cases in which the restriction was invalidated. However, of the 13 
invalidations, only two were predicated on the finding that the state did 
not have a “pressing and substantial” interest (i.e., compelling interest),69 
and the others were predicated upon the minimal impairment component 
of the section 1 analysis (i.e., narrowly tailored). In fact, despite the 
fundamental nature of an expressive rights claim, it appears that virtually 
any state objective can override the fundamental right if the restriction is 
narrowly tailored. Restrictions on speech have been validated in pursuit 
of preventing street nuisance,70 protecting personal reputation,71 combat-
ing noise pollution,72 maintaining a neutral public service,73 preventing 
littering and aesthetic blight74 and providing “a safe, welcoming public 
transit system”.75 Many of the section 2(b) challenges involve non-
criminal restrictions; however, the fact that expression is criminalized has 
not led to a more exacting scrutiny of whether the state’s overriding 
objective is truly compelling. There have been six challenges to criminal-
ized speech, and in five of the cases the restriction was upheld as the 
Court readily accepted that the state had a pressing and narrowly tailored 
objective.76 The only case in which the Court did not find a pressing 
objective was with respect to the archaic offence of “spreading false 
news”. The Court concluded that the offence was originally designed to 
protect the nobility from slanderous statements and there was no evi-
dence of a contemporary social problem necessitating the criminalization 
of spreading false news. This is the only case in which strict scrutiny was 
applied to the requirement of a compelling state objective, and its 
precedential value is limited as the invalidation is largely predicated on 
the fact that the offence is a relic of an earlier political and social culture. 
The rather timid approach to questioning state objectives becomes 
clearer when contrasted to American jurisprudence on free speech. In 
2011, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of 
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a California prohibition on the sale of “violent video games” to minors.77 
The Court first confirmed that restrictions on the content of protected 
speech are invalid unless the state “can demonstrate that it passes strict 
scrutiny — that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government 
interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”.78 It then concluded 
that “California cannot meet that standard” because it “cannot show a 
direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors”.79 
There were competing empirical studies on this issue, but the Court 
concluded that this is insufficient to override a fundamental right as the 
studies only “show at best some correlation between exposure to violent 
entertainment and miniscule real-world effects”.80 In Canada, this type of 
inconclusive evidence is a sufficient basis for grounding a state interest 
capable of overriding any right. There is a world of difference between 
this exacting approach on the American court and the deferential ap-
proach the Supreme Court of Canada has taken in addressing the fact that 
there are competing studies on whether obscene depictions cause, or are 
correlated, to anti-social conduct. In Butler, the Supreme Court upheld 
criminal restrictions on obscene expression, noting that: 
Accordingly, the rational link between s. 163 and the objective of 
Parliament relates to the actual causal relationship between obscenity 
and the risk of harm to society at large. On this point, it is clear that the 
literature of the social sciences remains subject to controversy. ...While 
a direct link between obscenity and harm to society may be difficult, if 
not impossible, to establish, it is reasonable to presume that exposure to 
images bears a causal relationship to changes in attitudes and beliefs. ... 
In the face of inconclusive social science evidence, the approach 
adopted by our Court in Irwin Toy is instructive. In that case, the basis 
for the legislation was that television advertising directed at young 
children is per se manipulative. The Court made it clear, at p. 994, that 
in choosing its mode of intervention, it is sufficient that Parliament had 
a reasonable basis: 
• In the instant case, the Court is called upon to assess 
competing social science evidence respecting the appro-
priate means for addressing the problem of children’s 
advertising. The question is whether the government had 
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a reasonable basis, on the evidence tendered, for con-
cluding that the ban on all advertising directed at 
children impaired freedom of expression as little as poss-
ible given the government’s pressing and substantial 
objective. 
And at p. 990: 
• ... the Court also recognized that the government was 
afforded a margin of appreciation to form legitimate 
objectives based on somewhat inconclusive social science 
evidence.81 
The Court’s deferential assumption that legislatures have a “good 
reason” to restrict fundamental rights is aptly captured by the Court’s 
statement that “in our view Parliament is also entitled to act on reasoned 
apprehension of harm even if on some points ‘the jury is still out’”.82 
Limiting rights on the basis of inconclusive evidence might be justified 
in the regulatory world, but once the choice of state intervention rises to 
the level of criminal sanction it would be reasonable to assume that a 
more exacting standard would be imposed. This expectation should be 
heightened when the sanction is being applied to the exercise of funda-
mental rights. 
Contrasting the American and Canadian approaches to strict scrutiny 
in the area of expressive freedom does lead to the mistaken perception 
that American jurists take the concept of a fundamental right more 
seriously than their Canadian counterparts. This is probably true in the 
area of expressive freedom; however, in terms of substantive due process 
and liberty, the early potential for achieving zealous protection of 
fundamental, personal decisions through the vehicle of substantive due 
process review has equally floundered in both jurisdictions. Despite the 
fact that American courts created the concept of non-enumerated funda-
mental rights, as time wore on American courts became reluctant to 
designate any new fundamental rights and continue to apply strict 
scrutiny to recognized decisions of a fundamental and personal nature. 
The retreat of American courts, and the dilution of the doctrine of strict 
scrutiny for fundamental liberty rights, has undercut the significance and 
value of the American approach for defining liberty in the Canadian 
context. 
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One of the problems which plagues both Canadian and American 
constitutional adjudication with respect to the validity of criminal 
sanctions targeting fundamental personal decisions has been the notice-
able absence of any coherent theory of criminal justice animating the 
court decisions. The following critique from an American commentator 
applies with equal force to the shorter history of Canadian courts 
struggling with the contours and scope of liberty: 
Indeed, beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923 through the recent 
case of Lawrence v. Texas in 2004, the Court has been deciding cases 
about the limits of criminal law. The confusion, that most people do not 
think the Court has ever adopted any constitutional theory on 
substantive criminal law, stems from the Court’s own decisions. None 
of the decisions explicitly reference traditional canons of criminal law; 
none of them rely on academic or philosophical justifications for 
criminalization; none of them acknowledge the limits of criminal 
sanctions as an independent constitutional value. Rather, these 
decisions rely on more rhetorical, lofty values such as privacy or 
liberty.83 
The first indication of the retreat of the American courts came in 
1986 with the infamous decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a Georgia criminal prohibition on 
sodomy.84 The previous cases on substantive due process appeared to 
establish as a fundamental liberty or privacy interest the right to sexual 
autonomy. The Court bluntly ruled that there is no fundamental right for 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy primarily because “condemnation of 
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical 
standards”.85 This decision allowed the dead weight of history to govern 
the development of fundamental, personal decisions worthy of constitu-
tional protection. 
History once again exerted a regressive force on American doctrine 
in 1997 when the United States Supreme Court articulated a new ap-
proach to determining when a right can be designated as fundamental for 
purposes of triggering strict scrutiny. In addressing whether assisted 
suicide can be designated as a fundamental, personal decision, the Court 
starts by noting that “we begin, as we do in all our due process cases by 
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examining our nation’s history, legal traditions and practices”.86 The 
Court then reiterates that we “have always been reluctant to expand the 
concept of substantive due process”87 before creating a new two-part test 
for classifying a right as fundamental or not: 
Our established method of substantive due process analysis has two 
primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due 
Process Clause specifically protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition”. ... Second, we have required in substantive due process 
cases a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest.88 
In applying the new criteria to the issue of assisted suicide, the Court was 
able to easily conclude that “the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in commit-
ting suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest”, and that the prohibition 
is “rationally related to legitimate government objectives”.89 To ensure 
that there is little doubt that the Court is signalling a retreat, the Court 
concludes by noting that “we do not weigh the relative strengths of these 
various interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and 
Washington’s ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their 
promotion and protection.”90 Although the United States Supreme Court 
makes no mention of our Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, both 
courts arrive at the same deferential conclusions based primarily on the 
dead weight of history. 
In 2003, there was a brief moment when it appeared that the United 
States Supreme Court was returning to its earlier activist approach to 
liberty with the release of the decision in Lawrence v. Texas.91 The Court 
overturned its 1986 Bowers decision and invalidated a Texas sodomy 
prohibition. In a decision of “staggering rhetorical breadth”92 the Court 
ruled that decisions about sexual intimacy were captured within the 
liberty interests protected by the due process clause. The Court’s rhetori-
cal breadth includes: 
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Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions 
into a dwelling house or other private places. ... Freedom extends 
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate 
conduct. ... when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct 
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal 
bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution 
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.93 
On first impression, Lawrence appears to create a distinctive zone of 
self-sovereignty in matter of sexual intimacy — the rhetoric supports the 
designation of sexual autonomy as a fundamental right which can only 
be overridden by a compelling and narrowly tailored state interest. 
However, a deeper look reveals that the Court was careful to ensure that 
it did not explicitly designate the right as fundamental, nor did it stipulate 
the standard of review it was employing. The dead weight of history 
from Glucksberg still played a major role, as the Court’s primary reason 
for overturning its earlier Bowers decision was its different understand-
ing of the nation’s traditions. Contrary to Bowers’ historical account, the 
Court concluded that “there has been no longstanding history in this 
country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter”.94 
The Court is clear as to what type of conduct is excluded from self-
sovereignty in sexual matters: conduct with minors; conduct involving 
injury or coercion; public conduct or prostitution;95 however, there is a 
lack of guidance and clarity with respect to sexual conduct warranting 
constitutional protection. In the post-Lawrence era courts are reaching 
disparate and inconsistent results on the reach of the right to sexual 
autonomy in the context of challenges to “anti-vibrator” laws, restrictions 
on “sexting”, polygamy and adult incest.96 It has been noted that “ap-
proximately seven years of Lawrence jurisprudence have demonstrated 
that courts are unwilling to find that Lawrence establishes a fundamental 
right”.97 Lawrence did manage to overturn the atavistic aversion that the 
Court displayed in 1986 with respect to homosexual sexuality, but it 
appears that the decision was not designed to do much more or to 
advance the substantive due process right to sexual autonomy: 
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Although Lawrence’s holding is clear — Texas’s statutory proscription 
against homosexual sodomy is unconstitutional and Bowers is 
overturned — it is unclear how the Court arrived at its holding. 
Kennedy extensively criticized Bowers but did not engage in a lengthy 
discussion of the statute at issue in Lawrence. Additionally, Kennedy 
did not articulate whether the right to engage in private consensual sex 
acts is a fundamental right or a simple liberty interest; and, under what 
level of review the Court evaluated the Texas statute: rational basis, 
intermediate review, or strict scrutiny. These unanswered questions 
make Lawrence a complicated decision with several conceivable 
interpretations.98 
Lawrence does not change the fact that the Court in Glucksberg 
changed the rules of the game to ensure that strict scrutiny for fundamen-
tal rights will rarely occur. The promise and potential of substantive due 
process has stalled as the lower courts struggle to understand the new 
rules of engagement: 
Unfortunately, the system described in Glucksberg has run into 
problems. This should be no surprise given the polarization that both 
the strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test have undergone. The 
strict scrutiny test is so strict that almost all legislation fails to meet it. 
Although it may not actually live up to its reputation as “strict in 
theory, fatal in fact,” it is the rare case indeed where legislation lives up 
to its requirements. Because of this, the Court has retreated into what 
one commentator has referred to as a “rights-identifying shell,” where it 
is hesitant to identify new rights. On the other hand, the only alternative 
allowed by the formula is the rational basis test, which is tantamount to 
no test at all ... . 
What has emerged, then, is an unworkable system. In this system, the 
Court professes to have a standard framework for substantive due 
process, the Glucksberg test, with a carefully regimented procedure for 
defining rights and then assessing their importance, which then 
translates into a formula for judging the validity of the law in question. 
The problem comes in cases where this framework produces a result 
that is incompatible with what the majority of the Justices think the 
right answer should be. In these “hard” cases, the right involved is not 
sufficiently accepted as important enough to be classified as 
fundamental. However, the only alternative is the rational basis test, 
which, as noted above, is almost toothless. In such circumstances, the 
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Court abandons the framework altogether. Thus, instead of the 
framework determining the answer, the answer itself determines the 
framework in many cases.99 
As in Canada, one cannot categorically conclude, based on the first 
three decades of the Charter, that the courts will never employ strict 
scrutiny to assess the validity of criminal sanctions being applied to 
fundamental, personal decisions. More accurately, it can be said that 
under the current doctrinal framework, the decision as to whether to 
designate a personal decision as fundamental and deserving of strong 
protection remains inscrutable and unpredictable. In reviewing the 
evolving history of substantive due process review in the United States, 
Professor Conkle has concluded that the American approach has become 
malleable and uncertain: 
[T]he contemporary Supreme Court has shifted its terminology from 
the “right of privacy” to “liberty,” and it has replaced strict scrutiny 
with a more open-ended balancing test. In so doing, the Court has 
formally and significantly moderated the doctrine of substantive due 
process. At the same time, however, the Court’s increasingly flexible 
approach is more malleable than its previous doctrine, making it all the 
more obvious that the Court is picking and choosing the liberties that it 
deems worthy of special protection. And the Court continues to be bold 
and aggressive, albeit on a highly selectively basis. In Stenberg, for 
example, the Court invalidated a “partial birth abortion” prohibition 
despite the broad political sentiment that favors such a ban. And in 
Lawrence, the Court reached out to overrule an existing precedent, and 
a relatively recent one at that, thereby thrusting itself once again onto 
the cultural battlefield of contemporary America.100 
Although American and Canadian courts have not developed a co-
herent and predictable approach to liberty and autonomous decision-
making, there has been greater success in Canada in employing section 7 
of the Charter to give effect to the “thin” version of the rule of law. To 
respect the dictates of the thin version of the rule of law, the Supreme 
Court has created four doctrinal tools to evaluate the validity of criminal 
legislation: (1) the law must not be vague;101 (2) the law must not be 
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arbitrary (the law does “little or nothing to enhance the state’s inter-
est”);102 (3) the law must not be overbroad (the means chosen to achieve 
the state objective “are broader than is necessary to accomplish that 
objective”);103 (4) the law must not be grossly disproportionate (the 
effects/harms of the law on people are grossly disproportionate when 
considered in light of the state objective).104 
Although there is an overlap among the four doctrinal tools, they are 
independent mechanisms for assessing whether the deprivation of liberty 
by criminal sanction is in accord with the principles of fundamental 
justice.105 These principles only permit indirect review of the merits of 
the law, as they are predicated only on reviewing the means chosen to 
achieve legislative ends. The ends or objective are not questioned as part 
of the review process. The four doctrinal tools developed by Canadian 
courts are far more rigorous than the tools employed by American courts 
to assess legislation in terms of compliance with the thin version of the 
rule of law. 
The vagueness doctrine was originally developed in the United 
States, and both jurisdictions employ the same elements and criteria for 
the assessment of the clarity of law.106 However, there is no American 
counterpart to the “gross disproportionality” doctrine, and the American 
arbitrariness and overbreadth doctrines, exist in a very limited manner. 
Facial review of legislation in the United States is very limited and a 
facial attack can only be sustained if it can be proven that “no set of 
circumstances exist under which [the legislation] would be valid” or 
“that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep”.107 This test incorpo-
rates the spirit of our arbitrariness and overbreadth doctrines but the 
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review for these constitutional vices in the United States is basically 
toothless, as it sets the bar too high. With respect to facial review for 
First Amendment challenges, the United States Supreme Court expands 
the overbreadth doctrine in a way that makes it more in line with the 
Canadian approach — a law restricting speech is overbroad “if a substan-
tial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to 
the state’s plainly legitimate sweep”,108 but this review of overbreadth 
does not extend to liberty claims. 
In the past year, the strength of the Canadian approach to compliance 
with the thin version of the rule of law has been demonstrated in dra-
matic fashion. In 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada relied upon these 
tools to compel the government of Canada to maintain an exemption, 
granted to a safe injection site, to allow this clinic to provide a safer 
venue for heroin addicts to inject their drugs.109 In March 2012, the Court 
of Appeal of Ontario invalidated, and read down, some of the prostitu-
tion-related provisions in the Criminal Code, primarily on the basis that 
these provisions impaired the security interests of sex workers by 
denying them the legal ability to take basic safety measures when 
working.110 These are significant decisions that show that review of 
criminal legislation on the basis of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality can impose significant constraints on legislative and 
executive acts. The cases may not advance the concept of liberty as 
fundamental, personal decision-making, but it is important to recognize 
that although there is confusion and uncertainty surrounding judicial 
implementation of fundamental rights under a thick version of the rule of 
law, the courts have shown a greater willingness to become more critical 
and demanding of lawmakers in terms of implementation of the “thin” 
version of the rule of law. 
IV. THE WEAK LINKS IN THE CHAIN 
The judicial reluctance to embrace heightened scrutiny for non-
enumerated, fundamental freedoms may be a simple product of the fact 
that there is nothing in the structure of the Charter which inexorably 
leads to this powerful form of judicial review. The American role model 
may have appeared to be an attractive approach as the American courts’ 
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reliance upon the “penumbra” of non-enumerated rights turned out to be 
a valuable tool for overturning some very regressive state policies in past 
decades. However, in contemporary times, the role model has retreated 
from this activist role. Although a commitment to classic liberalism and 
the rule of law supports the notion that the state must provide a reasoned 
justification for curtailing liberty, the concept puts a strain on judicial 
competence and legitimacy. It is easier to presume that lawmakers have a 
reasoned justification for acting than putting the government to strict 
proof of the compelling objective being pursued. In addition, courts may 
be reluctant to expand the reach of the Charter by creating a zone of self-
sovereignty because the exercise is fraught with subjectivity and inde-
terminacy. Sticking to the four corners of the text of the Charter is a safe 
option that does not expose the judiciary to accusations of political 
overreaching. 
Beyond the simple fact that judges may be uncomfortable taking on 
the responsibility of creating zones of self-sovereignty, which would be 
virtually immunized from state intrusion, there are other weak links in 
the chain. Both the crude structure of constitutional review and adjudica-
tion, and the state’s routine reliance upon blanket prohibitions, have 
stultified the growth of the thick version of the rule of law. Constitutional 
review is driven by the ultimate goal of invalidating legislation, and this 
zero-sum approach to constitutional remedies serves to deter most judges 
from embracing strict scrutiny for non-enumerated rights. The lack of 
nuance and flexibility in addressing constitutional claims does not foster 
judicial creativity. Any drive to creative activism is further deterred by 
the fact that legislatures tend to employ blanket prohibitions to address 
undesirable conduct. The same lack of nuance and flexibility in the 
legislative initiative effectively prevents a court from addressing consti-
tutional flaws in legislation with a less drastic remedy than invalidation, 
such as reading down the legislation to meet constitutional standards, or 
reading in the missing elements needed to make the legislation constitu-
tionally sound. 
In theory, there is little conceptual difficulty in categorizing and des-
ignating the choices of life-partners, and the decision about terminating 
one’s life, as fundamental, personal decisions. As mentioned earlier, it 
could be argued that the choice of intoxicating substances could also be 
designated as fundamental. However, the challenges to polygamy, 
assisted suicide and marijuana possession all failed partly because the 
Court was forced into the zero-sum game of wholesale invalidation of a 
blanket prohibition. Substantive due process could not be achieved 
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because the Court was concerned about the practical impact of the 
legislative vacuum of invalidation. So, the Court avoids this untenable 
situation by either trivializing the fundamental choice claim by calling it 
a mere lifestyle choice, or by exaggerating the compelling nature of the 
state interest. 
The Court can only stickhandle around the practical implications of 
designating a right as fundamental by elevating the state objective so that 
it appears compelling. This is accomplished by creating an impression 
that the conduct being restricted by state action is inherently harmful, and 
in this way, it becomes hard to resist the state’s claim that the blanket 
restriction on liberty is necessary for the proper functioning of society. In 
the construction of the state objective, all polygamists are exploitive, all 
drug users are irresponsible, all sex workers are vulnerable to predatory 
pimps and all terminal patients are incapable of autonomous choice. 
Although it is far beyond the scope of this paper to address this issue 
properly, I think it can be said with little doubt that there are egalitarian 
polygamists, responsible drug-users, respectful purveyors of sex and 
autonomous suicide-planners. We often do not know the percentage of 
those who are good citizens and those who are in danger or are danger-
ous to others, but it cannot be gainsaid that for all these activities there 
are some people who are exercising fundamental, personal choices and 
the law is interfering with this choice for “no good reason”, let alone a 
compelling reason. 
Under the current structure of constitutional adjudication, a court is 
ill-equipped to deal with the fundamental rights claim in a creative and 
responsive manner. Since the 1985 decision in Big M,111 it has been 
accepted constitutional doctrine that an accused person can challenge the 
constitutionality of criminal law even if the legislation can be applied in 
a constitutionally sound manner to the circumstances of the accused’s 
case. In other words, the irresponsible drug user and the abusive polyga-
mists are allowed to argue that the law violates the rights of others who 
may be deserving of constitutional protection. The Big M approach to 
standing may expand the ability of Canadians to raise constitutional 
claims, but it is self-defeating. First, bad facts make bad law, and when a 
court is confronted with an abusive polygamist it is unlikely to find the 
exercise of a fundamental, personal decision on the facts, or it will, 
consciously or inadvertently, elevate and exaggerate the state objective. It 
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is hard to find that the state does not have a compelling interest when you 
are dealing with rights-violators and not rights-advocates. 
More significantly, judicial activism will be further deflated when a 
court has to consider the zero-sum option of the invalidation of a blanket 
prohibition. If the court invalidates the blanket prohibition to protect the 
interests of a certain percentage of accused persons who are exercising 
fundamental choices, it leaves the state powerless, at least temporarily, to 
deal with those who are hurting others, or themselves, under the guise of 
exercising fundamental choices. The court can issue a suspended 
declaration of invalidity, but this still leaves the future uncertain. 
In the United States, an individual can launch an “as-applied” chal-
lenge in addition to a facial challenge — the as-applied challenge 
“targets the constitutionality of the statute as it is applied in the particular 
context of the case, and seeks to invalidate it only as applied to those 
circumstances”.112 This nuanced approach lowers the stakes of our zero-
sum invalidation game and could encourage greater judicial activism in 
the realm of fundamental, personal choice. The exploitive polygamists 
can be sanctioned in law while the polygamists who pose no risk of harm 
to others or society at large will have their fundamental choices protected 
by the Constitution. Unfortunately, this approach appears to be fore-
closed by the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of constitutional 
exemptions. A constitutional exemption under section 24(1), in lieu of 
the remedy of invalidation under section 52, is the equivalent of the “as-
applied” form of constitutional review, but the Court has consistently 
frowned upon this alternative remedy.113 Most recently, the Court stated 
that “such exemptions are to be avoided”114 for the reasons cited in 
Ferguson: 
Attractive as they are, the arguments for constitutional exemptions in a 
case such as this are, on consideration, outweighed and undermined by 
counter-considerations. I reach this conclusion on the basis of four 
considerations: (1) the jurisprudence; (2) the need to avoid intruding on 
the role of Parliament; (3) the remedial scheme of the Charter; and (4) 
the impact of granting constitutional exemptions in mandatory sentence 
cases on the values underlying the rule of law.115 
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Without a constitutional exemption in the remedial armour, a court 
will easily succumb to the standard state argument that a blanket prohibi-
tion is essential to maintain the integrity of its prohibition, and that it is 
impossible for lawmakers to fashion a nuanced, exempting scheme to 
protect those who are genuinely exercising a fundamental, personal 
choice. In the assisted suicide challenge, and the marijuana challenges, 
the Court acceded to the state’s argument that legislative resort to blanket 
prohibitions were necessary in order to “protect the vulnerable” and that 
there did not exist an effective mechanism for distinguishing in advance 
which people seeking assisted suicide or the use of marijuana would be 
vulnerable to the harms for which the law was enacted in the first place. 
One has to wonder whether the creation of a nuanced, exempting 
scheme is beyond the competence of both court and legislature, or 
whether it is really a question of political will. For example, in Rodri-
guez, Lamer C.J.C., in dissent, provided a detailed set of criteria to be 
followed for those who wished to exempt themselves from the blanket 
prohibition on assisted suicide.116 Although one could still argue over 
some of the details of this exempting scheme, his simple efforts, and the 
fact that subsequent to Rodriguez some jurisdictions have enacted 
exempting schemes,117 clearly undercuts the legislative claim of impo-
tence and suggests the problem is more related to indolence and a lack of 
political will. 
If legislatures resist the allure of blanket prohibitions, and courts em-
ploy more nuanced remedies than simple invalidation, there will be 
greater protection for fundamental, personal choices. For example, the 
value of flexibility is demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
treatment of the controversial issue of minors refusing blood transfusions 
based on religious objections. In A.C. v Manitoba,118 the Court reviewed 
the constitutionality of legislation in Manitoba, which permitted the state 
to override the objections of a minor to a blood transfusion. The legisla-
tion created a presumption that the wishes of minors over 16 would be 
determinative unless it could be shown they lacked capacity to under-
stand their decision. No such presumption existed for minors under 16. 
Not being faced with a blanket legislative prohibition on minors under 16 
being allowed to refuse a blood transfusion, the Court was able to 
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reconstruct the legislation to require that a court still undertake to 
balance the best interests of the child against the state interest before 
overriding the wishes of the minor. With this judicial construction, and 
the introduction of some degree of flexibility into the legislation regime, 
the Court was then able to dismiss the section 7 claim for invalidation on 
the basis that the legislation struck the right balance. Without wholesale 
invalidation, the Court was able to protect both the integrity of the 
legislation and the interests of the young person. 
Due to the fact that the medical choices remain the only personal 
decision which has been consistently characterized as a fundamental 
right under section 7, it is not surprising that this is the one area in which 
the courts have resisted the allure of the argument that blanket prohibi-
tions are indispensable to effectively achieving the legislative objective. 
As mentioned earlier, in the context of medical marijuana and safe 
injection sites, the courts have effectively required the legislature, or 
executive, to create exempting provisions to facilitate the medical use of 
a prohibited substance, or to permit a prohibited substance to be used in a 
controlled environment. These decisions did not lead to a surrender by 
the state in its war on drugs, nor did the introduction of flexibility and 
nuance impair the integrity of its prohibition. However, these decisions 
do permit the state to continue pursuing its policy of drug prohibition 
while allowing fundamental, personal choices to be respected and 
protected by exempting these choices from the reach of the prohibition. 
The tide may be turning, as appellate courts have recently taken a 
more skeptical approach regarding the state’s insistence that only a 
blanket prohibition will suffice to achieve a state objective. In Adams, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the claim that a blanket 
prohibition on temporary, makeshift shelters was necessary to prevent 
nuisance and disorder, as the Court believed that the state could construct 
more flexible “time, place and manner” regulations and in this way 
protection could be given to a homeless person’s fundamental, personal 
choice on how to shelter himself or herself in public spaces.119 Most 
recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford found the living on the 
avails provision to be constitutionally overbroad, and rejected state 
arguments that a blanket prohibition on accepting payment for services 
rendered to a sex worker was necessary to prevent abuse and harm to 
society. The Court stated: 
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The Supreme Court has identified two circumstances in which a blan-
ket prohibition can escape a charge of unconstitutional overbreadth. 
The first is if a narrower prohibition will be ineffective because the 
class of affected persons cannot be identified in advance: Clay, at 
para. 40. The second is if there is a significant risk to public safety in 
the event of misuse or misconduct: Clay, at para. 40; Cochrane, at 
para. 34. In our view, neither circumstance is present here. 
No case has been made out for a blanket prohibition on the second 
basis, danger to the public at large. The objectives of the living on the 
avails provision have not been cast in terms of public protection; rather 
the legislation is more narrowly focused on protecting prostitutes from 
exploitation. As we have said, this is a group that is uniquely 
vulnerable because of the nature of prostitution itself and the legislative 
framework that surrounds most prostitution-related activities. The risk 
of harm from pimping accrues principally to the prostitute, not the 
general public. 
The case for a blanket prohibition on the first basis — the difficulty of 
identifying the vulnerable group in advance — is superficially more 
compelling. We are, however, satisfied that the application judge was 
right to find that the living on the avails provision violates the 
overbreadth principle.120 
Although this decision was predicated on a deprivation of the secu-
rity interest, and not the liberty interest of making a fundamental per-
sonal decision, it does signal a more exacting review. In the majority of 
cases dealing with restrictions on liberty, the Court has acceded to the 
state’s claim that blanket prohibitions were integral to the integrity of a 
criminal prohibition by undertaking a highly deferential form or rational 
basis review, whereas, in this case, the Court appeared to be looking for a 
more solid empirical foundation beyond assertions based on limited 
research and anecdotal evidence. In Reference re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that “it is not 
enough to identify a public purpose that would have justified Parlia-
ment’s action. ... Where its action is grounded in the criminal law, the 
public purpose must involve suppressing an evil or safeguarding a 
threatened interest.”121 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Bedford is 
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one of the few occasions where a court seemed to demand from the state 
actual proof of the evil being fought instead of speculation about an 
imaginary axis of evil. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Substantive due process is a form of judicial review designed to give 
effect to the oft-quoted metaphor that the Charter is a “living tree capable 
of growth”. If the courts continue to rely upon history and tradition to 
constrain the growth of fundamental, personal decisions, constitutional 
review will not yield “a vibrant living tree but a garden of annuals to be 
regularly uprooted and replaced”.122 The prohibition on assisted suicide 
in Canada was largely premised upon an understanding of history and 
tradition, but reliance upon past practice has not led to a conclusive and 
final determination of the issue. Since the assisted suicide decision was 
rendered in 1990, there have been two efforts to revisit the constitutional-
ity of the prohibition,123 and this is not surprising since a historical 
approach does not address the reality that values are constantly evolving. 
Tradition may be a good starting point for assessing whether the law is 
unnecessarily interfering with the exercise of a fundamental, personal 
decision, but, ultimately, if substantive due process is to be more than an 
academic issue to be debated, the courts will need to begin to struggle 
with the thorny issue of whether tradition has been overtaken by evolv-
ing values.124 
In the assisted suicide case, Sopinka J. was aware of the stultifying 
impact of history on constitutional analysis. He noted that “[i]t is not 
sufficient ... to conduct a historical review. ... [A] strictly historical 
analysis will always lead to the conclusion in a case such as this that the 
deprivation is in accordance with fundamental justice.”125 Although 
Sopinka J. was unable to resist the call of history in making his decision 
on assisted suicide, his wise admonition must be taken seriously if 
substantive due process is to have any impact on the reach of substantive 
criminal law. In determining whether a restriction of liberty is legitimate 
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and sounds in the constitutional register, it matters little if the criminal 
prohibition has existed from time immemorial. Nor is it sufficient for 
assessing the validity of contemporary offences to simply trivialize the 
restriction on liberty by concluding that the conduct being prohibited has 
never in the past been considered a fundamental, personal decision. The 
rule of law demands that the state be able to provide a reasoned justifica-
tion for the restriction, and this justification should be compelling and 
contemporary. It should also be capable of being proved in an objective 
manner without resort to unsubstantiated assertions, provocative anec-
dotes and personal opinion. Of course, historically, courts have never 
called upon lawmakers to justify their actions, but now that the constitu-
tional tools are in place to facilitate this obligation to provide a reasoned 
justification, it does not seem entirely unreasonable or revolutionary to 
require the state to satisfy this obligation before it throws someone in jail 
for the exercise of a fundamental, personal decision. 
 
 
